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Abstract This survey brings together theoretical and empirical questions that have
been addressed in the economic literature on eBay, focusing on understanding the
behavior of buyers and sellers. We discuss several puzzles of bidder behavior and the
explanations that have been put forward by the literature for each. We then discuss
structural estimates of bidder behavior and measuring the consumer surplus derived
from eBay. We then try to understand why there are so many selling formats being
used simultaneously, and then focus on the critical decision variables for a seller in an
eBay English auction. Finally we analyze how trustworthy eBay sellers are on average,
and whether the feedback system provides strong incentives for good behavior.
Keywords eBay · Online auctions · eBay consumer surplus · English ascending
auctions
1 Introduction
In September of 1995 when Pierre Omidyar, the founder of eBay, auctioned off a
broken laser pointer on his website he started a commercial revolution. Auctions have
long been hailed by economists for their power to discover prices, but the primary
obstacle in their widespread use was the cost of gathering bidders. Internet auctions
overcome this critical problem. Three years later, in 1998, the gross fourth quarter
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merchandise volume of eBay was $307 million. In the fourth quarter of 2005, 10 years
after eBay was founded, total sales were $12 billion.1 In 2008 eBay bragged that if it
was a traditional retailer, it would be the sixth largest (measured by sales volume) in
the United States; and in the third quarter of 2008 it had negative growth for the first
time in its history. eBay now operates in 29 countries, selling everything from Cold
Mountain (the book, the DVD, and the mountain) to marbles.
Since eBay was the first Internet auction site, it has always benefitted from the
network economies of a marketplace: Buyers want to go where the most sellers are;
sellers want to go where the most buyers are. This simple logic made it unlikely that
a second general auction website could be as successful, and indeed none have been.
Both Yahoo! and Amazon launched competing websites in 1999. In 2007 Yahoo! offi-
cially closed their auction website in the United States and Amazon’s auction website
quietly stopped operating at around the same time. Yahoo! still operates in Asia and
other areas, but they have ceded the US to eBay.
In the US the only successful competitors seem to be niche auctioneers or com-
panies that offer auctions as a service. Thus, this survey comes at an interesting time
in the history of online auctions. With the closure of eBay’s competitors and the first
quarter of negative growth around a year removed, eBay appears to have entered what
could be considered a “mature” phase for the online auction marketplace.
So what does eBay look like? eBay was founded on Beanie Babies and other col-
lectable items; indeed a public relations manager fabricated a story that the founder
started eBay in order to help his fiancée trade Pez Candy dispensers (Cohen 2002).
While it is undeniable that collectibles are still the most popular category on eBay,
the second most popular is clothing. eBay used to be a marketplace for used goods;
now fully 47% of eBay listings are classified as new. Many items that are sold on
eBay are inexpensive, but it also has a thriving real estate category with around 3,000
listings, and eBay Motors lists over 60,000 cars and trucks for sale. In its 2008 annual
report, eBay Motors points out that a Ford Mustang is sold every 26 min. One can buy
anything from antique tractors to Blu-Ray disc players, and there are millions of items
sold for which shipping and handling costs exceed the sales price, while at the same
time real estate is sold for millions of dollars.
eBay no longer is exclusively an auction website. eBay offers its sellers several
different methods to sell items. The seller can use either a fixed price (Buy it Now,
abbreviated BiN), bargaining (Buy it Now or Best Offer, abbreviated BiN oBO), or an
auction. If the seller uses an auction and sells only one item, then the format is essen-
tially that of a traditional English auction with a hard closing time. In this format,
the seller can also include a BiN price, where a potential buyer may either bid in the
auction or accept the buy price and win the auction. If he bids and his bid is above the
secret reserve price (if there is one), then the BiN option disappears, and the selling
format continues as an auction. If the last bid is still below the secret reserve price, the
BiN option continues to be available. It is important to note that before 2003, when
the fixed price selling format was first made available on eBay, many eBay sellers
were setting the first minimum bid equal to the BiN price, which turns the format into
1 See http://investor.ebay.com/ for further information.
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a fixed-price selling format. Often, however, the minimum bid is set below the BiN
price, in which case a BiN auction combines features of both an auction and fixed-price
selling.
If the seller uses an auction and sells multiple items, then he must use a “Dutch”
auction. This is not the traditional Dutch auction in the economics literature; instead
it is a multi-unit auction where bidders bid a number of units and a price per unit. The
BiN selling format2 uses a traditional fixed price. If the buyer chooses the option “or
Best Offer”, this will allow personal negotiations between the buyer and the seller.
In some categories the seller can also place traditional classified ads. In this way the
seller advertises the good with a fixed price on eBay, but the transaction takes place
outside of eBay, and the seller does not have access to eBay services such as Feed-
back and Problem Resolution. Fixed-price sales of all varieties make up 42% of the
gross merchandise value of goods sold on eBay but 73% of the listings. Auctions
(almost exclusively English Auctions) make up only 12% of the listings but 58% of
the sales.3
Clearly eBay is of interest to economists mainly because it is a new and revolu-
tionary trading method. However, it is also a tremendous data resource. For example,
if one wanted to analyze English auctions, information on the buyer, the seller, all
bids placed, and information about the bidders for the last month can be obtained
from eBay’s website. There were 3,170 Ford Mustangs that were listed on eBay in
February of 2009. Of course one might find Ford Mustangs to be too heterogenous.
Perhaps new Blu-ray players are of more interest. In a recent search we found 2,384
items that closed in January 2009, of which approximately 80% were sold.
One can also find items whose values are almost completely determined by resale,
or common value items such as US mint and proof coin sets (834 closed in January
2009); this market is analyzed in Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003a). One could also examine
private value items such as music CDs (480,758 new CDs that were listed in 1 month
were analyzed in Nekipelov 2007). One could also track sellers longitudinally (like
Cabral and Hortaçsu 2010) and horizontally by using a seller-specific search. One can
find all the items on which a bidder has bid in the last month, as well as the complete
feedback history of both sellers and buyers. One also can generate a unique dataset
from eBay. Katkar and Reiley (2006) conducted a field experiment and Bapna et al.
(2008) offered a sniping program to eBay bidders in order to gather data. Garratt et al.
(2004) recruited eBay bidders for an Internet experiment on second-price auctions.
Before beginning our review we would like to mention several other literature
reviews and an early survey of the eBay market. In 1998 Lucking-Reiley (2000) pro-
vided an accurate overview of the eBay market in the early days of its development.
Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004) is also an excellent survey of the early literature. Ocken-
fels et al. (2006) is a thorough and detailed analysis of electronic auctions, focusing
especially on the experimental literature.
In contrast with these papers, we will not spend much time analyzing market design.
eBay is reluctant to change their format since they face substantial opposition from
2 Notice that here we discuss BiN as a selling format, not as an option in an auction.
3 For detailed information about different selling formats, see http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/formats.
html.
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users each time they do and furthermore, they seem more inclined to listen to their
buyers and sellers than to economists. Our survey will focus on understanding the
behavior of buyers and sellers on eBay.
We begin with a brief overview of the eBay market. Section 3 next discusses buyer
behavior on eBay, primarily focusing on auctions. We discuss several puzzles of bidder
behavior and the explanations put forward by the literature for each. We then discuss
structural estimates of bidder behavior and one of the most interesting outcomes of
structural estimation: measuring the consumer surplus derived from eBay. We then
switch to the more complex problem of seller behavior in Sect. 4. We begin by trying
to understand why there are so many formats being used simultaneously, and then
focus on the critical decision variables for a seller in an eBay English auction. Finally
in Sect. 4.3 we analyze how trustworthy eBay sellers are on average, and whether the
feedback system provides strong incentives for good behavior. We then summarize
and discuss some general directions for future research in Sect. 5.
2 The eBay Market
One of the more striking features of the modern eBay platform is its remarkable diver-
sity and the large volume of goods for sale. While it is still the case that much of eBay’s
volume is composed of used, low price, and collectible items, there still are millions
of items listed everyday that do not fit this category. The second largest category is
clothing, and 63% of those listings are classified as new. eBay motors had over 60,000
cars and trucks listed. In 2004, Andrews and Benzing (2007) found 600 auctions for
Honda Accords in a three week period. There were 1,045 listings in January of 2009.
eBay claims 100 million items on sale worldwide at any given time. In a cursory survey
on the veracity of this claim, we found 78 million on sale at eBay.com alone.
eBay is no longer primarily an auction website. Overall only 12% of their listings
in our quick survey were auctions, but this adds up to 9.4 million auctions. A vast
majority (69%) of the listings on eBay are store inventory, the stock of items from
eBay stores. Table 1 provides information on the relative importance of the selling
formats by category. Sellers can pay a fixed fee to have an official eBay website list of
the items that they have for sale, and eBay store owners also can list items normally
on eBay and pay a reduced fee for those listings.
Currently sellers have three different methods of selling their items: they can use
an auction, fixed price (Buy it Now, BiN), or bargaining (Buy it Now or Best Offer,
BiN oBO). It is unlikely that this list of options will decrease in the future, but it could
increase. For example the auction format when the seller wants to sell multiple units
(the “Dutch Auction”) seems to no longer be used frequently, but it is still an option.
In a few categories there are two types of bargaining available. The sellers can
either use BiN oBO or they can use a traditional classified ad, with the final sale
and negotiation taking place off eBay.4 BiN oBO allows standard, and unfortunately
4 Classified advertisements can be placed in the (sub)categories: Businesses for Sale, Trade Show Dis-
plays, Real Estate, Specialty Services, Travel, and Everything Else. See http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/
adformatfees.html.
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private, bargaining between the seller and the bidder regardless of whether the seller
has one item or multiple items. The buyers make offers, and the seller can accept, reject,
or make a counteroffer. Generally the offers and sales history only show that offers
were accepted or expired though for a while the highest rejected offer is also recorded.
The privacy of behavior in this market makes analysis much more problematic than
in auctions since of course buyers also do not have access to this information.
This type of selling seems to have replaced the multi-item auction on eBay known
as the “Dutch” Auction. After trying different keyword searches for Dutch Auctions,
we were able to find only 2,238 auctions, representing .024% of all auction listings.
“Dutch Auction” seems to be a slang for either not knowing what you will get or that
there is more than one item available. Other listings (usually from very experienced
sellers) had general statements that included information about Dutch Auctions. Usu-
ally these warned bidders about the differences between Dutch Auctions and regular
auctions. In the Dutch Auction there is no proxy bidding, and the bidder bids a price
per unit and a number of units. The price is set by the lowest winning bid. The lowest
winner has a right to refuse delivery if he does not get the quantity he demanded. This
means that even if a bidder wants one unit, then she must bid as if she is in a first
price (pay your bid) auction; and if she wants more than one, she has an incentive to
decrease her demand so that she is less likely to set the price. It is no wonder that some
sellers have general warnings about such auctions, as they most likely have had many
complaints about not understanding the rules. Indeed many sellers do not seem fully
to understand the rules either, since 22% of the auction listings we checked were for
one item. Since a Dutch Auction must be for two or more identical items, it is clear
the sellers themselves do not know what a Dutch Auction is.
If sellers choose to use an auction and have only one item to sell (or choose to use
multiple single-item auctions), they can use a type of auction that is like a traditional
English auction but with a hard closing time. In these auctions bidders can place their
maximum willingness to pay (or less than that if they want to revise their bid in the
case of being outbid) into a proxy bidding program. The proxy bidding program then
raises the current winning price until it is either the second highest bid plus a bidding
increment or the highest bid, whichever is smaller.
Throughout the rest of our survey, unless we specifically mention otherwise, we
will focus on single-item auctions. These auctions may last from 3 to 10 days. They
can have an open reservation price which is called a “first bid,” and a second, secret
reservation price (called simply a “reservation price”), and they can also have a “Buy
it Now” option that disappears once a bid is placed that is higher than the first bid
or the secret reservation price.5 When a bidder bids he can observe the value of all
bids up to that time, except the last bid by the highest bidder. The bidder places a bid
using the proxy bidding program. This amount can be the current winning price plus a
bidding increment or any higher value. The program then raises the price until either
5 eBay has recently begun experimenting with a plan that extends the length of time that the BiN option is
available: specifically, until the auction price is 50% of the BiN price. eBay started this test in October of
2007 in Parts & Accessories, Tickets, Clothing, and Cell Phones; and to the best of our knowledge it contin-
ues to this day. See http://forums.ebay.com/db1/topic/Auction-Listings/Longer-Lasting-Buy/2000449591
for more information.
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the new bidder is the only one willing to pay that price, or the new bidder loses to the
current high bidder. The one difference between this and a standard English Auction
is that, on eBay, auctions have a hard closing time. While this has been questioned
in the academic literature, buyers and sellers appear to like it since it provides more
certainty to the parties in the transactions. In an online auction that would replicate
the traditional English Auction format, the length of the auction would need to be
changed to last 5–10 min longer each time someone places a bid, and thus the buyer
and seller would never know when the auction would end.6
The seller also has other options to increase the visibility and the salability of his
item; eBay has tutorials devoted to this subject. The tutorials encourage sellers to use
pictures, detailed descriptions, and to have long titles that can turn up on many differ-
ent searches. The seller can purchase the right to be a “featured item”, which means
that the item will always appear at the top of any relevant search. The seller also can
advertise that he has free shipping and is willing to accept payment by PayPal.
Seller fees are based primarily on the first bid or secret reserve price and the final
sales price. For auctions, the insertion fee is essentially trivial, from 10 cents to a high
of $4.00 (if the higher of the first bid or secret reserve price is $500 or more). The final
sales fee is higher, and decreasing as the final sales price increases. Currently, for the
first $25 of the sales price the seller is charged 8.75% (5% in Lucking-Reiley 2000);
for any remaining amount above $25 and below $1,000 the seller is charged 3.5%
(2.5% in Lucking-Reiley 2000); and for every higher dollar the seller is charged 1.5%.
While still dwarfed by the fees from traditional auctioneers like Sotheby’s (where the
charge on the final sales price can be as high as 35%) the 42% increase in eBay’s fees
since 2000 shows that it is taking advantage of its market position. For fixed price sales
the insertion price is at most 15 cents, but the final sales fee is higher. The highest
percentage fee is for Books or DVDs that are sold for less than $50, where the final
sales fee is 15% of the price. The fees for extras are generally fixed. For an auction to
be a featured item the cost is $24.95.7
When deciding what type of mechanism to use, the seller has a plethora of informa-
tion available. All listings (including unsold items) are available on eBay for 1 month
after the listing is closed. This data base is easily searchable, so the seller (or the buyer)
can often find other auctions and fixed-price sales for the exact item being considered.
One can also find all other listings by a given seller, and the purchases of a given buyer
in the last month. The complete feedback history of both buyers and sellers also is
public information.
The feedback of buyers and sellers is a numerical evaluation from the point of view
of the seller and buyer. After a transaction has been completed, the buyer and seller
may rate the other party as good (+1 to feedback), neutral (0 to feedback), or negative
(−1 to feedback). Since 2003 eBay also has posted the percentage of positive feed-
backs on the auction web page. Along with the numerical rating, people are encour-
aged to leave text comments and a Detailed Seller Rating, which rates the seller in five
6 Amazon had this feature on their auction website; and as can be seen (at: http://glinden.blogspot.com/
2006/04/early-amazon-auctions.html) this has caused complaints.
7 All of these fees are current as of January 2009.
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different categories (Item as Described, Communication, Shipping Time, and Shipping
and Handling Charges) from 1 to 5.
eBay claims to be constantly working to improve the feedback system, and cur-
rently eBay displays the raw feedback rating and the percentage of positive feedback
in the last year on all auction pages. The eBay web pages also contain icons that
indicate a seller’s and buyer’s feedback, and have a special category, power seller,
that indicates a given seller has a high volume of sales and a high feedback rating.
Clicking on someone’s feedback score takes one to a page that shows the number of
positive, negative, and neutral feedbacks in the last month, the last 6 months, and the
last year. Unfortunately, all reporting depends on voluntary action by the buyers and
sellers, so there is selection. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) report that only 52.1%
of buyers leave feedback. In 2008 eBay no longer allowed sellers to provide negative
feedback to bidders in an attempt to improve the response rate, an important factor in
eBay auctions, since before this revision feedback was potentially subject to revenge
strategies. Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) report that negative feedback has a 40% chance
of being returned, and that neutral feedback has a 10% chance of retaliation.
Clearly a researcher or analyst of eBay auctions has a wealth of data concerning
common value items, private value items, and mixtures of the two. Goods sold in
private value auctions are valued by the utility that the consumer will enjoy from
consuming or owning the good.8 Private value items may be resold once (many items
on eBay are used), but they are almost never resold again. Examples are clothing,
electronic items, and DVDs or CDs. Goods sold in common value auctions are items
for which the true value is the same for all bidders, but bidders may have different
information about this value. An item rarely has a pure common value. A characteristic
of a pure common value item is that its value is based primarily on resale. Collectible
items (approximately a third of all items on eBay) are generally considered common
value. These include trading cards (Katkar and Reiley 2006) or coins (Bajari and
Hortaçsu 2003a). Other examples of common value items are those purchased only
for their commercial value. These include mineral rights (Wilson 1977) and oil fields
(Hendricks et al. 1987), which are not commonly sold on eBay.
Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003a) develop tests for common values in collectible coins.
A hallmark of common value items is the “winner’s curse”, wherein the winning bid-
der will be the most optimistic bidder, and thus is likely to be too optimistic. Based
on implications of the winner’s curse and a suggestion in Paarsch (1992), they regress
the value of the winning bid on the number of bids. Paarsch (1992) points out that if
the winner’s curse is present, then more bidders would imply that the winner is more
optimistic, and this will lead bidders to lower their bids more. For example, if there
is only one bidder, then the winner is simply that bidder, and the winner’s curse is
non existent so the bidder should just bid his value. If there are ten, then the winner
is more optimistic than nine other people, and thus his estimate is likely to be too
high, and in equilibrium this will lead bidders to lower their bid. Bajari and Hortaçsu
find the expected negative coefficient, which implies that there are common values,
as one should expect with collectible coins since a priori analysis suggests that the
8 Whenever we use private values in the text the reader should understand that the private values are also
independently distributed.
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coins should have common values. Their test assumes that all bids are the bidder’s
true estimate of the item’s value. Since bidders bid multiple times on eBay, this may
not be true, because the bidder may be planning to increase her bid at a later time,
but then may reevaluate her bidding strategy and discover that the item is not worth
the higher planned bid. This would result in a negative coefficient even in a pure pri-
vate values environment.9 In order to be executed properly, the test should only use
bids that have been submitted in the last few seconds of the auction, and the number
of bidders should be the number of bidders who submitted bids prior to the given
bid.
The primary reason a good on eBay might have a common value component is
asymmetric information. This is a significant problem on eBay, which has instituted
the feedback system to help encourage both buyers and sellers to provide information
accurately. eBay encourages participants to use PayPal (which is owned by eBay),
where the payment is made only after both parties indicate that they are satisfied with
the transaction. Despite these measures, a substantial amount of information is not
provided, and this is particularly problematic for used goods.
One of the recurring and common problems on eBay is that sellers may not provide
a detailed description of the item for sale. Yin (2006) used surveys to test whether
used computers have a common value component or not. Since computer technology
is advancing at such a high pace, a priori one would expect the resale value of com-
puters to be very low, and thus one would classify computers as goods with private
value characteristics. However, these are used computers, and many are sold based
on rather incomplete descriptions leading to substantial uncertainty about their value.
Yin was able to download the item description from eBay, expunge it of all seller
related information, and then take a survey of the items’ values. She found that the
variance of the survey respondents’ estimated values had a significant negative cor-
relation with the sales price, indicating that more uncertainty was associated with a
greater discount.
However, the average estimate generated by her survey was almost twice the aver-
age sales price. It is theoretically possible that the proper sales price is half the value
due to the winner’s curse, but it is unlikely. The more likely explanation is that survey
respondents had no incentive to conduct their own research on the item and thus had
incomplete information. However, even if the survey respondents had much worse
information than the bidders, the correlation does suggest that the bidders also had
incomplete information. The potential for asymmetric information is one reason many
empirical researchers examine relatively new and standardized goods. Since each sale
must involve some asymmetric information, researchers must be careful to ascertain
how much asymmetric information is present and whether it is an important factor in
determining the value.
9 Assume that in every auction only two bidders bid 1 and all other bidders bid 0. In an auction with n bidders,
the average number of bids observed by any one of the bidders who bid once is (2 − 1)/(n − 1) = 1/n − 1.
Since we do not observe the highest bid, only that it is higher than the second highest bid, we can not use the
highest bid in these calculations. In the case where the average bid is observed by an outsider, the formula
would be 2/n.
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3 Buyer Behavior
There has been relatively little analysis of how the buyers choose among the three
different eBay auction formats. However, there has been extensive analysis of the
choice within a given mechanism. Most of the viable theoretic explanations of why
buyers would buy at a fixed price instead of an auction rely on risk aversion (Mathews
and Katzman 2006; and Reynolds and Wooders 2009). A less analyzed but probably
important factor is the cost of keeping track of auction bids and completing a transac-
tion at a time removed from when one bids. As the New York Times online shopper
says, “…in a busy life it can be too difficult keeping track of the auctions you have
bid in …”.10
In this section we will treat fixed price buying as an outside option for the type
of format for which eBay is famous: single-unit auctions. The optimization problem
for a bidder in such an auction is relatively straightforward: When buyers come to
eBay, they can search for the item in which they are interested and will see an array
of listings. The bidder can sort the list based on time to closing, time left, and highest
or lowest current price (including shipping and handling) and can choose an auction
in which to bid or a listing from which to buy.
On the asumption that the bidder finds an auction (with up to 10 days left in which
to bid), he can bid the current price plus one bidding increment. However, this will
only waste time because eBay has a proxy bidding machine into which the bidder can
enter the highest bid that he is willing to pay. This amount is kept confidential from
other bidders and the seller. The proxy bidding program compares his bid to those of
the other bidders; then it will increase the current winning price (which is observable
to everyone) until either he is the sole bidder willing to pay that price, or he has been
outbid by someone else. Once he has been outbid, he can choose a different auction in
which to bid or he can bid a second time in the same auction. The bidder can revise his
bid anytime by bidding a higher amount, but he cannot lower it. This bidding system
allows bidders to avoid coming back to re-bid every time that another bid is placed.11
Optimizing in this environment is relatively straightforward from the perspective
of classical economic theory: If the auction that a bidder chooses to enter is considered
in isolation, the bidder can bid any finite number of times before the auction ends. If
it is a pure private values auction, then since no one else’s bid depends on his bid, he
could bid at any time. If the auction has common values, such as the mineral rights
model in Wilson (1977), then the problem is slightly harder. If other bidders believe
an item is valuable (and bid large amounts), a given bidder should increase his bid.
Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003a) show that this implies that everyone should bid at the
end of the auction. More generally, most goods are a mixture of private and common
values, and bidders have affiliated utility functions (Milgrom and Weber 1982). With
these goods the key characteristic of common value auctions remains. Thus, we can
be certain that the insight in Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003a) generalizes, and one should
10 See ONLINE SHOPPER; Here’s a Concept: Fixed Prices at eBay. The New York Times, July 5, 2001.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE6DE1638F936A35754C0A9679C8B63.
11 Please see the FAQ’s page of eBay for further information about proxy bidding: http://answercenter.
ebay.com/thread.jspa?threadID=900039195&tstart=0&mod=1163650373615.
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bid at the last possible time in the auction. What should one bid? In eBay auctions one
should just bid what one thinks the item is worth. This was first shown in the private
values environment by Vickrey (1961), as well as in the most general environments
by Milgrom and Weber (1982).12
From the perspective of economic theory, the complex behavior of bidders on eBay
presents an intellectual challenge: While theory does predict that without loss of gen-
erality the bid should come towards the end of the auction, bids are often submitted
so late that they sometimes don’t get in. This is a practice called sniping (Roth and
Ockenfels 2002). While theory predicts that there should be only one bid, bidders
frequently bid more than once, a practice referred to as incremental bidding. Bidders
are often observed to bid large amounts early, a practice either called squatting (Ely
and Hossain 2009) or jump bidding (Avery 1998). Explanations put forth for these
practices center around the basic point that eBay is not one auction in isolation but
rather a competitive auction marketplace.
In the remainder of this section we discuss these three puzzles of bidder behavior.
We then outline various methods to estimate the bidder’s behavior. We end the section
with a discussion of how to measure the consumers’ benefit from these auctions.
3.1 Sniping (Last Second Bidding)
One of the most celebrated puzzles in bidding behavior is last second bidding, called
sniping. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) found in a survey that 37% of final bids are submit-
ted in the last minute and 12% in the last 10 s, and similar results have been confirmed
by many other surveys. The puzzling thing about this behavior is that it is possible that
such bids are not received before the deadline, so the bidder loses the auction even
if he wanted to place a winning bid.13 eBay formerly communicated this possibility
directly to bidders on a web page that explained to bidders that, if they were upset
because bids did not get in, then they shouldn’t snipe.
Perhaps the simplest explanation for sniping behavior is that there are partial com-
mon values. Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003a) show that this would induce last minute
bidding on eBay and that the last minute bids would not necessarily have to be entered
in the auction with certainty. Recall that in a pure private values environment the bid-
der is indifferent on bid timing and thus, even if there is a small element of common
value for the item, it would be sufficient to induce the bidder to bid at the last sec-
ond. Nekipelov (2007) argues that partial common values are natural in eBay auctions
because of common uncertainty about market conditions. He further notes that even
if a good has only private value, the number of bidders may still be determined by the
“visibility” of a given auction. This market specific variable would be unknown but
estimated by the bidders and would induce a common value to the auction, which in
turn would provide enough of an inducement for sniping behavior.
12 We note that, as in Sailer (2006), this may include the continuation value of the bidder if he does not
win this auction.
13 No one has ever documented how high the probability of a bid not getting in is. It is probably less than
1%, and probably is decreasing as eBay perfects its software.
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Ockenfels and Roth (2006) put forward another simple explanation: They point
out that sniping is simply a best response to incremental bidding. If some bidders bid
incrementally, increasing their bid by the bidding increment until they are the high
bidder, then it is always best to bid when those bidders cannot respond, which would
occur during the sniping window (the last minute or seconds of a hard closing auction
during which the bidders with the aim of sniping place their bids). Wintr (2008) shows
in a field experiment that more incremental bidding leads to more sniping, which
is consistent with this hypothesis. Ely and Hossain (2009) also confirm the simple
explanation of Ockenfels and Roth (2006) and verify that sniping does have a small
empirical benefit in field experiments. Peters and Severinov (2006) have shown that
incremental bidding can be part of an equilibrium in an auction marketplace. In that
equilibrium incremental bidding is used to sort bidders among the auctions; if two
bidders bid at the same time in an auction, then one moves elsewhere, and the current
winner has not lost much since both parties only bid the increment. This explanation
is simple and explains the observed phenomena.
One reason for the presence of sniping may be because the seller may engage in
shill bidding. This is analogous to having a third party (or alternative identity) bid in
the auction just to drive up the price. Engelberg and Williams (2009) show that eBay
is especially well designed for a seller to enter shill bids. If the highest bid is less than
a bidding increment above the second highest, the sales price is the highest bid, thus
the shill bidder can bid apparently strange amounts, ending in 19 cents for example,
and push the price up until the highest bid is revealed. For example, assume that the
current price is $26 and the current highest bid is $30. If the shill bids are entered $x .19
for x ∈ {26, 27, 28, 29} , then when the shill bidder bids slightly more than $29, the
current price will be $30 and the shill bidder can stop increasing his bid. Clearly, a
simple best response to this type of strategy is to snipe.
One of the more well known explanations for shill bidding was put forth in Roth
and Ockenfels (2002) “snipe or war” strategy. In a pure private values environment,
bidders can agree to wait until the sniping window before placing their bids. If all
bidders follow this strategy, then competition will be reduced since some bids will not
be registered. However, to enforce this behavior one has to start a bidding war if a
bidder bids earlier, which is the “war” part of the strategy. Gonzalez et al. (2009) show
that these equilibria exist under very general conditions. While this strategy is theo-
retically possible, it is very complicated, and it is not clear how such a strategy could
become common knowledge in a market like eBay. Furthermore, it is questionable if
this would characterize an equilibrium, since bidders could leave the auction and bid
elsewhere.
This led Gonzalez et al. (2009) to develop a general test for these types of equi-
libria. Their test is based on the observation that if bidders are using a snipe or war
strategy, then auctions in which the final bid is placed early should be “war” auctions
and be more competitive than auctions that end during the sniping window. One can
thus test for the difference between the two distribution of bids; and in their empirical
study of a large number of eBay computer monitor auctions, Gonzalez et al. find no
significant difference in the two distributions. Wintr (2008) also confirms this result
with a difference in medians test. Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003a) examine results from
reduced form regressions that indicate that early bidding is not correlated with a high
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final sales price. Neither of the two latter tests hold for every snipe-or-war strategy, but
the failure to confirm the hypothesis through the use of a variety of tests is informative.
Equilibrium in the “snipe or war” strategy game relies critically on the uncertainty
that is involved with a successful snipe. If it is certain that a late bid will be success-
fully entered, then sniping should disappear. In contrast, Ariely et al. (2005) conduct a
laboratory experiment and find that if the sniping bid will be recorded with certainty,
sniping actually increases.
One can estimate the benefit to sniping. Gray and Reiley (2004) found that the
price was 2.54% lower when the experimenter bid with just 10 s left, but this was not
statistically significant. Ely and Hossain (2009) found that sniping (bidding in the last
5 s of the auction) gives 1% more surplus when compared to bidding once early in
the auction (squatting.) The bids were lower in Ely and Hossain (2009) than in Gray
and Reiley (2004), and the Ely and Hossain data set is larger, possibly explaining the
statistical significance of their results as well as reflecting more accurately the proba-
bility of winning given the bid. Neither study reported that the sniping bids failed to
get into the auctions.
3.2 Incremental Bidding
One of the uncelebrated puzzles of bidding behavior is that bidders frequently bid
multiple times. Instead of simply entering a true maximum willingness to pay, bidders
increase their bid by small incremental amounts over time. Wilcox (2000) shows that
the average bidder submits 1.5–2 bids, while Ockenfels and Roth (2006) report 38%
of bidders bid at least twice. This may seem counter-intuitive. For example, Bajari and
Hortaçsu (2003a) show that in a common (or affiliated) values environment bidders
should bid only once. Moreover, bid preparation does have a positive cost, and thus
multiple bids are not costless. Indeed, Ockenfels and Roth (2006) refer to this behav-
ior as “naive.” Peters and Severinov (2006), however, show that it may be part of an
equilibrium strategy. They analyze a simultaneous auction of many identical units of
a private value good. Each bidder is assumed to have a unitary demand, and price in
each auction is determined by the traditional English auction mechanism. Peters and
Severinov show that there is an equilibrium in which bidders always use an incre-
mental strategy and switch auctions (cross-bid) if another auction has a strictly lower
price. Intuitively they use the incremental strategy to coordinate behavior. If two high
value bidders are in the same auction, then one of them will switch to another one. One
implication of the Peters and Severinov model is that a large number of bids would be
expected rather than only a few. However, bid preparation cost in their model is zero.
Stryszowska (2005) provides an example of a two-auction game wherein no equi-
librium exists when bidders do not bid early and in equilibrium everyone bids twice. It
is likely that with more auctions some bidders would bid more often with high proba-
bility. Nekipelov (2007) finds that this is the case in a market in which values are private
but there is an unknown market parameter about which bidders have heterogeneous
information. This essentially makes the values of bidders affiliated, and incremental
bidding is used to discourage entry by others. Whether those results obtain in a pure
common values or a traditional affiliated values environment is unclear. Empirical
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evidence on whether bidders cross-bid is mixed. Tung et al. (2003) tracked simulta-
neous online auctions on identical consumer electronic items and found large price
disparities. The arbitrage opportunities that this implies contradict the basic theory of
Peters and Severinov (2006). In contrast, Anwar et al. (2006) collected data for CPU
auctions and found that behavior was consistent with economic theory. Bidders tended
to bid in the auction with the lowest high bid, and auctions that ended at about the
same time had more cross-bidding. Furthermore, cross-bidders did well by their strat-
egy and on average they paid 9% less in a successful bid. Ariely and Simonson (2003)
also found strong evidence of cross-bidding, and that when there were many similar
objects on sale the reserve price had little impact on the final sales price. Further tests
of this hypothesis would be helpful.
This type of behavior is problematic for empirical analysis. The reason is that in
a private value environment if someone is bidding more than once, then clearly the
early bid does not reflect the bidder’s true value of the good. Thus, how do we know
that the resulting price is equivalent to the bidder’s value? Gonzalez et al. (2009) show
that a bidder’s last bid must be equal to his value if he believes it is possible to win.
This guarantees that the sales price (the second highest bid) can be trusted. However,
it is not clear how one evaluates other bids. In a common value environment bidders
submit multiple bids because other bidders’ bids revealed information to them, but
then this means that their later bids must incorporate the information contained in
other bids. It is not clear how one would analyze this type of bidding behavior in a
structural model that lent itself to empirical implementation.
3.3 Squatting or Jumping
A strategy that has only come to note of late involves bidding a large amount early in
the auction. This is similar to a type of strategy that is used in traditional auctions called
“jump bidding” (Avery 1998). However, on eBay it serves a coordination role, so a
new term is appropriate. Ely and Hossain (2009) refer to this strategy as “squatting.”
With a jump bid the primary goal is to induce one’s competitor to quit the auction.
By bidding a large amount early in the auction, the bidder intimidates her opponents
into dropping out. This traditionally has been used in pay-your-bid auctions, where
one bidder can immediately raise the price far above the current level. As discussed
in Gonzalez et al. (2009), the proxy bidding program that eBay employs prevents this
behavior. In order for the size of a jump bid to be observed another bidder must bid a
similar amount, or it must be “called,” and this is unlikely. They define a three-stage
game with “jump-call strategies” for the highest and the second highest value bidder.
A “jump-call” strategy for the highest value bidder is driven by the desire to win the
auction; for the second highest value bidder, the “jump-call” strategy is driven by the
desire to make the highest bidder pay the high price. Gonzalez et al. develop a test for
this class of equilibria by exploiting the sniping window. An auction with a successful
“jump-call” bid should always terminate before the sniping window; if there is bidding
in the sniping window then it must be because several people wanted to make jump
bids. These auctions should be more competitive on average, and thus the average
price should be higher. They find some evidence in favor of this hypothesis, but only
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if inexperienced bidders are included in the test. When auctions with inexperienced
bidders are dropped, the null hypothesis of no jump bidding fails to be rejected at
nominal significance levels.
Ely and Hossain (2009) emphasize a different purpose to such large early bids on
eBay. In their model the amount of the bid is not critical. If an auction has a large early
bid, then that would indicate there is real competition in the auction; thus it would be
better to bid in a different auction. They call this type of bidding “squatting,” which
is essentially bidding to deter entry. Nekipelov (2007) finds a similar type of strategy
in his model; and while he emphasizes the importance of entry deterrence in such a
strategy, he refers to it as a “jump bid.” Peters and Severinov (2006) have a similar
result in that incremental bidding in their model enables optimal sorting, much like a
squat bid in Ely and Hossain (2009) wherein if there is an active bidder in an auction,
then one goes elsewhere.
3.4 Estimation of Bidding Functions
In our survey we have found that almost all empirical studies that use eBay data focus
on bidder behavior, and thus we do also in this section. We will discuss the general lit-
erature here; a detailed discussion on methodology is provided in an Appendix to this
paper: “Methodology: Structural Parametric and Nonparametric Methods in Online
Auctions” by Seda Bülbül Toklu, which can be found at http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/
~seda.bulbul/.
Substantial progress has been made in developing better methods to estimate bid-
ders’ behaviors in eBay single item auctions. The early papers essentially directly
apply classic theory, while later studies also formally address entry. Only recently has
research begun to deal with the thornier issue of exit. We are unaware of any paper
that has successfully addressed both entry and exit in a cohesive structural empirical
model.
Bidders who come to eBay generally bid on an item after some search and exam-
ination of the items. If outbid, the bidder can then repeat this process. It is possible
that the bidder’s past failure may influence future bidding behavior, based in part on
the effort that he has expended in researching for the first bid that he has entered. The
issues addressed by the various methodologies we consider below involve the size of
the bid and what informs the bidder to select it.
Among the many possible considerations that are made by the bidders during the
scenario we just outlined is that no consideration at all is given to the personal value
that the bidder attaches to the item. Peters and Severinov (2006) examine a model in
which the price is the value of the highest losing bidder in all of the auctions. Only
one person, who will only bid in one auction, sets the price for every auction simulta-
neously. Of course this is only one of many possibilities, and there does not yet exist
a general theory of bidding in eBay auctions and the empirical verification of this
theory. This would be needed before we could characterize precisely how prices are
determined in such an auction mechanism.
In the face of such uncertainty the appeal of reduced form or hedonic analyses is
greatly enhanced. In such settings one can posit some causal relationship between
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the product’s characteristics and the conditional mean of the sales price, and one can
always appeal to arguments for local linearization of the bidding function. While the
generality of one’s conclusions with empirical models of this sort are not clear, one
could argue that until there is a verified structural and general theory of bidding on
eBay one cannot be any more confident of conclusions based on a general structural
approach. Nevertheless, there has been at least one significant development in the
literature that can be used to construct a joint model of the bidding function and the
number of bidders; thus at the least one can estimate the entry function.
It has become clear that some variables such as feedback and the presence of a secret
reserve price will have more of an impact on entry than on the bid given entry. For
example, Dewally and Ederington (2004) are able to separate the number of bidders
into an expected and unexpected number, and find that the two variables have signifi-
cantly different impacts on the value of the wining bid. An increase in the unexpected
number of bidders has about a 5% impact on the sales price, while an increase in the
expected number has about a 1% impact. Livingston (2005) finds that the impact of
the first few positive feedback reports is significant both in terms of entry and in terms
of the price.
Sailer (2006) appears to have been the first, and to our knowledge, the only work
that estimates a bidder’s behavior taking into consideration the impact of exit. In the
Sailer model it is assumed that all bidders enter the auction that will end first. They
bid once, and after that particular auction has closed they move on to the next auction.
When exit is possible bidders have to consider (when placing their bid) the continua-
tion value that they will receive if they do not win a particular auction when placing
their bid; and thus that value will be subtracted from their private value for the sale
item. In the Sailer model, the continuation value varies across individuals since they
have heterogeneous bidding costs. If one was to assume that all bidding costs are
the same in the Sailer model, then the bidding costs would essentially be constant
in the bidding function. This model is non-parametrically identified by applying the
techniques of Song (2004) to identify the distribution of bidder’s values, and then
using this distribution to identify the distribution of bidding costs. Sailer finds that the
average bidding cost is 2% of the final bid amount. Unfortunately, the technique in
Song (2004) uses the third highest bid; and, unlike Song, Sailer does not carefully test
which third highest bids can be safely utilized.
The Sailer model also can be simplified to make exit irrelevant, and implicitly this is
the perspective taken in all studies that do not address exit. The term for this maintained
position used in the literature is the steady state hypothesis. It posits that bidders are
homogenous and the number of auctions, the number of bidders, and the characteris-
tics of the auctions are all drawn from an identical distribution. Under this hypothesis
the impact of exit will be absorbed in the constant term of a linear regression. One
could weaken this assumption by merely assuming that all of these distributions are
common knowledge. In this case the constant would be indexed by time. One could
also consider that bidders do not have the same information about the continuation
value, which would imply that the continuation value has a common value component.
The importance of this component would depend on the extent of heterogeneity in the
bidder’s information set. This last complication may not have a significant impact, but
it would be interesting to consider it formerly in future eBay auction models.
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None of the models we discuss below formally analyze exit. Instead they focus
on the entry problem. Implicitly the authors assume that entry is not reversible, and
thus that once the bidder enters the auction she can never enter a second one. If this
is the case, then it should be clear that a bidder’s strategy is not affected by the fact
that she is in an auction marketplace once she has entered. Entry by itself causes few
problems. It does put downward pressure on the reservation price, but does not affect
the bidder’s strategy.
Generally one assumes that bidders enter the auction without knowing their value
for the good being auctioned, and that this entry decision follows a stochastic rule. In
Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003a); Giray et al. (2010) and Nekipelov (2007) the random
entry process is Poisson. Nekipelov (2007) adds the interesting twist that entry is
endogenous—affected by the current price. This causes squat bidding, but otherwise
does not affect the final amount bid.
With a stochastic entry rule one can use a number of estimation approaches, such
as Bayesian methods (Bajari and Hortaçsu 2003a), maximum likelihood (Giray et al.
2010), simulated non-linear least squares (Gonzalez et al. 2009), and non-parametric
methods (Song 2004; Adams 2007; Nekipelov 2007; Haker et al. 2010). Since we are
analyzing English auctions, the difficulties of using maximum likelihood that Donald
and Paarsch (1993) point out do not arise, and the Bayesian or maximum likelihood
techniques are straightforward in theory, although this may not be the case in regard
to their implementation. The non-parametric techniques are less familiar, and thus we
will discuss them next in more depth.
Song (2004) was the first to provide a method to estimate the bidder’s values non-
parametrically. Given two bids one can identify the underlying distribution of values
without identifying the number of bidders; and by using the third highest bid to iden-
tify the distribution as a function of the total number of bidders, one can substitute
this out of the distribution of the second highest bid. Unfortunately, this leaves the
analyst without information about the entry process, which is interesting in its own
right. It also requires the use of some of the third highest bids. The use of such third
highest bids can be problematic. While with the second highest bid the bidder knows
that if he increases his bid, then he may win, and thus he should raise the bid to his
true maximum willingness to pay, this logic does not hold with the third highest bid
(or other bids), because after the bidder places his bid he may be outbid by two other
people, resulting in a sales price above his true willingness to pay. Thus the bidder
will not enter a new bid, the highest recorded bid will be less than the willingness to
pay, and thus it would appear that we cannot use it with this nonparametric approach.
However, Song (2004) points out that the hard closing time of eBay auctions pro-
vides an out. Bidders who bid with only a few seconds left in the auction must know
that the given bid is their last and thus should enter their true willingness to pay. Based
on this insight, Song (2004) tests for which bids can be used in the estimates and finds
that in general, as long as the first and second highest bid are submitted with two hours
left or less, then the third highest bid can be used in the estimation. A final problem
with this methodology is that much of the auction data are lost. The size of the data set
is often much more important for nonparametric estimation than it is for parametric
estimation. Since it is necessary to use only auctions where there have been three
or more bidders in order to identify non-parametrically the distribution of bidders’
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private values, one must often also discard all auctions that did not attract that much
competition.
In order to respond to these problems, Adams (2007) shows how non-parametrically
to identify and estimate both the bidders’ values and the entry process jointly. While
this is a great stride forward, the assumptions that are required are quite stringent and
would appear to be only tenable when analyzing relatively homogenous items. In the
Adams model identification is achieved by having no common variables determine
the entry process and the bidder’s values. If the good is relatively homogenous, then
this assumption may be defensible, since for a homogenous good entry will only be a
function of the current price and the time left in the auction—neither of which should
affect the bidder’s value. However, even in this latter case, on eBay the seller’s feed-
back rating will likely affect both the entry level and the bidders’ valuations. Based on
Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010), one may argue that the impact of the seller’s feedback
rating will be more important for the entry decision than the bidder’s valuation and thus
exclude it from the bidder’s valuations, but this is just identification by an exclusion
restriction, which presumably the champions of nonparametric identification would
find problematic.
Nekipelov (2007) overcomes both of the problems in these methodologies. The
main innovation in his model is that entry is endogenous. Potential bidders observe
the price before they decide whether to enter or not. This innovation makes it possi-
ble to identify the entry function and the distribution of values non-parametrically. In
Athey and Haile (2007) it is impossible to identify both the number of bidders (the
entry process) and the distribution of bidders because the number of bidders is exoge-
nous; thus an increase in the number of bidders or the distribution of values could both
explain an increase in the sales price. On the other hand, with endogenous entry if the
price increases due to an increase in the total number of bidders, another bidder is less
likely to enter, while an increase in the distribution of values makes it more likely for
a bidder to enter. Thus the two effects have a different impact on the entry process,
making it possible to identify this process and then the distribution of bidders.
Nekipelov’s methodology is computationally intense and implementation is diffi-
cult, but this is a hurdle that is worth the payoff. The model is a mixture of private
and common values. While the value of the good itself is pure independent private
values, the amount of entry is partially determined by a visibility parameter. Different
bidders have different information about this parameter, and this causes a common
value component to bidding. The auction is also modeled as a continuous time auction.
Numerical techniques are used to solve for the equilibrium bidding strategies. More-
over, an innovative simulation methodology is put forth for estimation. The payoff
from this complicated structural model is that it is identified non-parametrically under
innocuous regularity conditions. Due to computational complexity, the key polyno-
mial functions are only estimated as quadratics, and do not include standard control
variables like the seller’s feedback. Fortunately, the choice of data set makes this more
innocuous than it usually would be, since the data set is made up of a relatively homog-
enous auction item, Madonna CD’s. Since this is a relatively homogenous and low
price good, trust would probably be inconsequential in such a market.
The Nekipelov study has both contributions to auction theory and to the econo-
metrics of auctions. While it is cutting edge econometric methodology, theoretically
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it shows that the inclusion of a visibility parameter solves standard puzzles of bidder
behavior on eBay. With this parameter and endogenous entry, bidders bid early (squat
or jump bid) in order to deter entry; they bid at the last second (sniping) to prevent
learning by their opponents; and they bid multiple times over the course of the auction.
An implication of this theory is that if the supply of a good is exogenously increased,
then there should be more squat bidding. This implication is tested in a field experi-
ment by increasing the supply of the Robbie Williams CD “The Greatest Hits,” and
Hong and Nekipelov (2009) formally verify that there is more squat bidding.
If one is analyzing a common value auction, then the task of developing a model of
entry becomes relatively more difficult. In such a common value auction Bajari and
Hortaçsu (2003a) prove that bidders will only bid at the last minute. This transforms
the problem formally into a sealed bid second-price auction, and makes the calculation
of the bidding function relatively tractable. In order for this assumption to be strictly
met, one would need all bidders to submit bids simultaneously, and this is contradicted
by the data. However, there does not seem to be a tractable alternative at this time.
In the basic English auction model, once a bidder exits an auction he can not
re-enter, and thus one can immediately back out the bidder’s value based on when he
dropped out of the auction. However, in eBay auctions bidders bid whenever and as
many times as they want, and although it is clear that we can expect them to bid less
than they may believe the item is worth, it is unclear how much lower we can expect
them to bid. To understand this we would need to know why and by how much they
will bid early; and as of yet we have no model that would provide such insight for
common value goods. Thus bidders in an eBay auction cannot be sure if the bid that is
observed for an opponent is the true final bid of these bidders or is a preliminary bid
that will be updated at the last moment. In such an environment the direction suggested
by the simplifying assumption of Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003a) is an expeditious way to
proceed. While bidders may take into account the number of previous bidders in some
reduced form manner, we think it is reasonable to doubt whether they can structurally
estimate each bidder’s value from his bid. This does not limit the analysts to only
Bayesian estimation methodologies. They could equally easily use maximum likeli-
hood, and in theory non-parametric techniques, although none of the non-parametric
techniques discussed above were specifically designed for this purpose.
3.5 Consumer Surplus
One aspect of the eBay auction format and its ubiquitous presence that deserves more
scrutiny is its ultimate benefit to society. It is relatively easy to develop an estimate
of producer surplus (PS) based on eBay’s gross merchandise sales. It is, however,
possible to hypothesize that most values on eBay are drawn from a small family of
distribution functions, in which case there should be some link between consumer
surplus (CS) in different markets. For this reason it is worthwhile to estimate the CS
in a variety of markets in order to gauge its range.
In order to assess the range of CS in different auction markets it is necessary to
develop a standardized metric. There are two methods that have been suggested in the
literature. Bapna et al. (2008) suggest using relative surplus while Giray et al. (2010)
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suggest using the lower bound of the consumer’s share. For a given auction these two
techniques are functionally related, but the former is more easily generalized while
the latter is more stable.
Essentially, relative surplus is the amount of consumer surplus for each $1 in sales.
The attractiveness of this CS metric is its simplicity. Simply multiply relative sur-
plus by the gross sales to arrive at the total consumer surplus in a given market. If
v is the consumer’s value for the good and the price is p then the relative surplus is
(v − p)/p = (v/p) − 1.
A problem with this technique is that if there is only one bidder in an auction, p
can be as low as one cent, or v/p ∈ [1,∞), making the relative surplus sensitive to
outliers in low auction participation rates.
The consumer’s share of surplus addresses the very important issue of the competi-
tiveness of eBay auctions. As the number of bidders per auction grows, the consumer’s
share will tend to zero and vice-versa. If r is the seller’s value of the good, then the
consumer’s share is (v− p)/(v−r). Unfortunately, estimating the seller’s value of the
good is difficult. Given eBay’s fee structure, one cannot even assume that the reserva-
tion price always exceeds seller’s value. However, one can assume that r = 0, which
simplifies the analysis substantially, and provide a lower bound on consumer share,
(v − p)/v = 1 − p/v. This number is not easily and immediately generalizable but
it is more stable than the relative surplus; it is bounded since p/v ∈ (0, 1], and thus it
will be less sensitive to a thin market and a corresponding low number of bidders in a
particular auction.
Bapna et al. (2008) offered eBay bidders the free use of a sniping program to collect
their data. A bidder should enter his true value into the sniping program since the bid
will be submitted at the last possible instant. This allowed the authors to collect a large
number of data points in auctions where the winner’s value is known with relative
certainty. Unfortunately, their data set is also quite heterogeneous, and no attempt is
made to control for this heterogeneity. Bapna et al. do compare their sampled auctions
with a random sample of auctions and find no significant difference in characteristics
between the two sets, which suggests that their sampled auctions are representative of
the general population of auctions. This does not, however, address the potential prob-
lem that bidders using their program may not be a representative sample of potential
bidders. Bapna et al. show that CS is very heterogeneous across different categories
but only report the relative surplus over all markets. They find the median relative sur-
plus to be 0.22, corresponding to a lower bound on the consumer share of 0.18. Based
on their mean surplus per category they estimate that eBay generated $1.5 billion of
CS in 2003.
In her CS analyses, Song (2004) studies one very specific market: the market for
university yearbooks. Using non-parametric techniques she estimates a median CS of
$25.54. Given a median sales price of $22.50, this corresponds to a median relative
surplus of 1.14 or a median lower bound of consumer’s share of 0.53. Given the rela-
tively low amount of demand for these goods, it is not surprising that her estimate is
so far above the general estimate of Bapna et al. (2008).
Giray et al. (2010) used a variety of parametric and Haker et al. (2010) uses non-
parametric methods to estimate CS in the market for computer monitors. Using para-
metric techniques the median lower bound of the consumer’s share varied from a
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minimum of 0.30 (based on logistic distributed private values) to a maximum of 0.56
(based on Pareto distributed private values). Giray et al. also utilized a number of
nonparametric tests to search over the best parametric method. Their results favor
logistically distributed private values, suggesting a preferred estimate of 0.30 for the
lower bound of consumer’s share. Hasker et al. utilized the technique of Song (2004)
on a subset of the data and found that with either a full nonparametric or a semi-non-
parametric method, the estimated lower bound on consumer share is around 0.22.
A problem with estimating CS using either nonparametric or parametric methods
involves the sensitivity of estimates to the tail properties of the distribution of private
values. Since nonparametric techniques assume that the density is zero when there are
no nearby observations, this methodology will tend to underestimate CS. The differ-
ences between the nonparametric and the parametric estimates from Giray et al. are
consistent with this potential downward bias. On the other hand, the tail properties with
parametric techniques are often determined by observations that are far from the tail,
since the support of the one-sided private value distributions is typically unbounded.
4 Seller Decisions and Reliability
The sellers’ various decisions are not as well understood as the buyers’ decisions. The
seller has a much more complex problem, one for which the complexity has greatly
expanded lately, and it is thus natural that our understanding of it is not as clear.
This section begins by looking at the most important and yet least understood choices
involving the selling format. There are a large number of selling formats available on
eBay and practically every one is used in every category, even for the same item. We
briefly review the literature on this topic, a literature that is clearly in need of more
significant development. We then focus on the three primary decisions that a potential
seller using an English auction has to make. These involve setting the public reser-
vation price (“first bid”), setting the secret reservation price (or simply “reservation
price”), and the decision to use a Buy it Now (BiN) price. We end the section with a
discussion of reliability and trust in eBay auctions. We focus on evaluating evidence
on outright fraud and other dishonest behaviors on eBay and the effectiveness of the
feedback system that successfully reinforces the seller’s honesty.
4.1 Selling Format
The choice of selling format is an under-researched topic in the eBay auction liter-
ature. eBay has recently started allowing all sellers to sell by Auction, Fixed Price,
and Bargaining, but there has been little analytic work addressing these decisions and
their impacts on the auction mechanism. Table 1 provides evidence of the mix of
selling formats on eBay. Overall, 73% of items are sold by fixed price (BiN), 14% by
bargaining (BiN oBO), and 12% by auctions. The ratio of listings between auctions
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and the other categories requires a bit more explanation. All store inventory (69% of
listings) is listed as BiN or BiN oBO and is listed until cancelled.14
The variation among categories is substantial. 71% of all Real Estate is listed as
auctions, Specialty Services is 94% fixed price, and Tickets is 39% bargaining. With
the exceptions of Specialty Services, Real Estate and Stamps, no major selling tech-
nique is represented by less than 5% of the listings in any category. For specific items
the diversity is similar. Of the 2,438 January 2009 listings of the Nintendo Wii Game
console system in new condition, 49% were for a fixed price, 24% allowed bargaining,
and 27% were auction listings. For a new copy of the Dark Knight DVD there were
260 listings of which 61% were for a fixed price, 8% were available by bargaining,
and 31% were being offered in auctions.
Much of the first generation theory on seller behavior focused on explaining when
one type of selling mechanism or another was superior. For example, McAfee (1993)
showed that competing sellers will choose an auction, even if they choose among all
the mechanisms on eBay. Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) show that if buyers arrive one
at a time, then a fixed price mechanism is always the best type. However, heteroge-
neity in sellers on eBay is no less important and is often-overlooked factor as with
buyers. Harris and Raviv (1981) show that a monopolist seller with large capacity
will use a fixed-price format, while a seller with small capacity will use the auction
format. Although instructive, this prediction from their model is at variance with the
observation that many eBay virtual stores use both auctions and fixed-price selling.
Circumstantial evidence suggests that some of these auctions are for advertisement
but a casual survey suggests that stores often are auctioning too many items for this
purpose alone.15
There are several studies that have tried to explain at least two of the seller mecha-
nisms. Most of these explicitly require the seller to be a monopolist. Bose and Daripa
(2009) solve for the optimal mechanism when there is a significant probability that a
bidder may have a fixed high value. They show that this implies a fixed price for the
high value bidders but that the mechanism can be decentralized using a fixed-price
sale and an auction with a temporary BiN option. However, the reason the high value
consumers buy at the fixed price is because if they do not, it might be purchased by
another high value bidder at the fixed price. On eBay there are auctions and fixed
price sales running simultaneously, and it is unclear if the Bose and Daripa findings
are applicable to the reality of the eBay marketplace. In Etzion et al. (2006) buyers
can always choose to bid in an auction or buy at a fixed price. They enter the auction
because they are impatient. Unfortunately, eBay auctions are closing continuously,
which implies that no one should buy at a fixed price.
Several papers have shown that if either bidders or sellers are risk averse, then auc-
tions with a permanent BiN option are revenue superior to an auction alone (Hidvégi
et al. 2006; Mathews and Katzman 2006; and Reynolds and Wooders 2009). It may
be possible to extend these models and show that a seller would do better to use both
fixed price and auction sales. Kultti (1999) takes a different approach by explicitly
14 The sellers can list the items for 30 days, but the listing is automatically renewed. Auctions can last a
maximum of 10 days.
15 See http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/07/business/businessspecial/07GUER.html.
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analyzing a market where sellers can either use a fixed price or auction and where there
are new sellers entering each period. He shows that in the dynamic equilibrium the
choice of mechanism may not matter, since both produce the same average revenue.
While the standard eBay auction and the auction with a BiN price are widely used,
the fixed price selling format with a “Best Offer” option is used rarely. The seller is
allowed to use the “Best Offer” option in the fixed price (BiN) and classified ad selling
formats. With this option, the seller gives the buyers a chance to negotiate the price
with him; hence we call it the “bargaining selling format”. After the seller receives
a Best Offer from a buyer, he can either accept it and end the listing, decline it and
optionally explain the reason to the buyer, or respond with a counter offer that expires
within a reasonable amount of time if there is no response from the buyer.
The evaluation of the Best Offer from a buyer can be done individually or auto-
matically. For automatic evaluation, the seller sets a lower limit below which the Best
Offers are automatically rejected, and an upper limit at or above which the first received
Best Offer is automatically accepted. The seller responds individually to Best Offers
between the upper and the lower limits. For all the rejected Best Offers, the seller has
the option to respond with a counter offer below the BiN price.
There has been relatively less analysis of bargaining versus either of the other seller
methods, and perhaps this is natural since it is well known that bargaining with incom-
plete information can be inefficient. The common belief that auctions are most often
used as opposed to posted price when the object value is widely dispersed among
buyers is confirmed by the findings of Wang (1993) in a dynamic independent private-
values model. However, Bremzen (2004) shows that a posted price can be a costly
signal of high quality, and one can conjecture that this would explain the use of posted
prices as well as auctions or bargaining.While this is intuitively worthwhile it seems
to contradict the evidence that items sold in new condition are commonly bargained
and auctioned.
A general insight offered by Levin and Smith (1994) may be relevant in this context.
They find, when considering only auction mechanisms, that a more general revenue
equivalence theorem holds because mechanisms that offer more surplus attract more
entrants. Thus on average, all of the mechanisms may offer a similar surplus. In other
words, any two auctions that are revenue equivalent for a fixed number of bidders
remain revenue equivalent in a mixed-strategy entry equilibrium. Remembering the
result of Reynolds and Wooders (2009) that when a buy price is low enough to be
accepted with positive probability, then the BiN auction yields less revenue than a
standard eBay auction for risk neutral bidders, we can say that Levin and Smith’s
generalization would not seem to explain the coexistence of buy prices and standard
auctions.
There is ample evidence that some sellers have long sought the fixed-price sales
format. eBay has allowed store owners to use this technique since 2003, but has only
recently allowed other sellers to use this format. Before this recent inclusive change,
many sellers were able to enter an auction with a BiN option and set the first bid so
high that bidders could essentially only buy at the fixed price. Anderson et al. (2004)
noted that 40% of the auctions in their study with a BiN option were actually using
this way to sell at a fixed price. Of the 133 auctions that were not fixed-price sales,
only one ended at the BiN price. They analyzed auctions for Palm Vx handheld com-
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puters and found that more experienced sellers were more likely to use fixed-price
selling, although this was less likely to happen if the item was new. Hendricks et al.
(2005) found the same tendency but it was even more widespread in the market for TI
calculators. Out of the 3,000 transactions approximately 30% used a temporary BiN
and for the substantial majority of these the first bid was at least 90% of the BiN price.
Understanding the advantages of this popular alternative and the potential for this
type of selling format displacing the typical eBay auctions format is a research topic
that deserves attention. Any theory that attempts to understand these phenomena
should pay careful attention to Standifird et al. (2004) and Lee and Malmendier (2007).
Standifird et al. (2004) auctioned 84 American Eagle silver dollars and found that bid-
ders were reluctant to buy at the BiN price, even when it was substantially below the
market price. Even more problematic are the findings of Lee and Malmendier (2007)
who study the market for the board game Cashflow 101 with a retail price of $195.
While it was a relatively thin market, with less than 50 auctions per month, there were
two professional sellers who consistently sold the game using a fixed price. The aver-
age sales price in the auctions was higher than the average fixed price. Seventy-four
percent of the auctions ended at a price that was above the fixed price, while 25%
ended ten dollars or more higher. As Ariely and Simonson (2003) point out, it would
seem that consumers under-search, and this could lead to consumers over-paying, a
conjecture that is supported by the eBay search engine itself. The eBay search engine
allows one to select items being auctioned and items being sold at a fixed price, and
thus buyers who like one format may not check other options.
4.2 Choices in an English Auction: Buy it Now, Reservation Price, and the Secret
Reservation Price
A seller has four variables that he can choose when he uses eBay to auction his goods:
the length of the auction, the first bid (public reservation price), the reservation price
(secret reservation price), and whether to offer a BiN option. We discuss each in turn,
focusing more attention on the latter three variables in subsequent sections.
eBay auctions currently run for 1, 3, 5, 7, or 10 days.16 Only recently has eBay
allowed auctions to have a shorter duration, and we are unaware of any formal anal-
ysis of this decision using recent data. Two papers analyzing the choice of length of
auction using data from the early days of eBay are Gonzalez et al. (2009) and Lucking-
Reiley et al. (2007). Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) analyze the market for collectible
pennies by using reduced form log-linear regressions of price on the number of days.
They find that extending an auction from 3 to 10 days increases the sales price by
53%. Gonzalez et al. (2009) analyze the market for computer monitors with a struc-
tural model, wherein the number of potential bidders was determined by the length
of the auction. They found that increasing the auction from 3 to 10 days increased the
price by only 11% on average, and 8% of increase could be captured by extending the
auction from 3 to 5 days. They also found that more experienced sellers tend to use
shorter auctions for low-price goods.
16 In Real Estate, auctions can run for 30 days.
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Whether or not these results would hold for more recent auctions is an interesting
research question. We do know that eBay has decided to allow shorter auctions, which
would indicate some demand for them. The conditions under which auctions of vary-
ing durations would be optimal is also an understudied topic that would be the basis
for a potentially fruitful research agenda.
4.2.1 Reservation Price
There are two outstanding puzzles concerning reservation prices. The first involves the
seller’s common preference for a secret reservation price (which is called a “reserva-
tion price”) over a public reservation price (which is called a “first bid”), even though
there is an additional fee for using a secret reserve.17 The second involves the reasons
why (in general) reservation prices are set so relatively low. In the traditional auction
literature Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) showed that the seller can
significantly increase his revenue with an appropriately chosen reservation price. For a
private values good the main benefit is screening since if there is only one bidder in the
auction, the reservation price is the amount the bidder must pay. If there are affiliated
values, then Milgrom and Weber (1982) emphasize a secondary benefit of a reserva-
tion price, since the fact that the seller thinks that the item is valuable may raise the
bidders’ assessment of the item’s value. Samuelson (1985), in a procurement auction
setting, finds that the buyer minimizes his expected procurement cost by setting the
ceiling price strictly below his cost, while the social cost is minimized by setting the
two values equal. On the other hand, other papers conclude that when an auction has
entry, the reservation price should be set at the seller’s (or, in a procurement auction,
buyer’s) valuation (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1987; McAfee and McMillan 1988; Levin
and Smith 1994).
In the Gonzalez et al. (2009) study of computer monitors this would suggest that
12% of the sellers must value the monitors at less than one dollar, which does not seem
likely. Furthermore, field experiments find that increasing the reservation price does
increase the selling price. Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2003) auctioned identical
postage stamps while systematically varying both the first bid and the shipping and
handling fees. They find that increasing either variable did increase final sales price
significantly. Ariely and Simonson (2003) studied tickets for the Rose Bowl and found
that the first bid (public reservation price) was positively correlated with the price.
Market saturation may be one factor in the disparate findings of how price and
reservation price are related. Ariely and Simonson (2003) show that if many similar
items are auctioned simultaneously, then the first bid has little impact on the sales
price. Hoppe and Sadrieh (2006) compared auctions with the first bid set at the min-
imum or 60% of the blockbuster movie DVDs and collectible coins value. The sales
price was basically independent of the policy, and thus auctions with a low first bid
produced higher profits because of lower fees. Since the only case in which the first
bid matters in the classic theory of Myerson (1981) is when there is one bidder whose
17 Currently this is the higher of $2 or 1% of the secret reservation price, with a maximum of $50.
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value exceeds the first bid in the auction, then if the probability of this is low enough,
small first bid fees could induce auctioneers to have very low first bids.
Another explanation may come from the fact that eBay itself does not charge for
shipping and handling fees. Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2003) show that raising
the shipping and handling fees can increase the revenue. Hossain and Morgan (2006)
auctioned Xbox games, and found that low first bids and high shipping costs raised
more revenue than high first bids and low shipping costs, although they did not find
this to occur with music CD’s where shipping fees are often a large percentage of
the sales price. This may be one reason that eBay now automatically computes the
shipping and handling fees. eBay even allows users to sort based on the price plus the
shipping and handling fee. It is unlikely that the modern eBay bidder will ignore these
fees.
4.2.2 Secret Reservation Price
The economics literature is often silent on the subject of secret reservation prices
and may give the impression that usually reservation prices are public knowledge in
auctions. This is in keeping with the ground breaking works of Riley and Samuelson
(1981) and Milgrom and Weber (1982), who argue convincingly against keeping this
information secret. However, Ashenfelter (1989) points out that in reality there is
often a secret reservation price in auctions. One can readily confirm this by check-
ing the Sotheby’s website, where the term “secret” reservation price is not used. The
term “reservation price” is generally understood to be for a price that is confidential
between the seller and the auctioneer. The fact that this common empirical behavior
is not addressed in most auction models is somewhat problematic.
eBay may well be an excellent platform for understanding this phenomenon. There
is theoretical support for the usefulness of a secret reservation price in the private values
environment. Brisset and Naegelen (2006) show that if bidders are risk averse and the
seller can commit to using a secret reservation price, then it may be an optimal seller
strategy. For a secret reservation price to be optimal the seller must be unsure about
the value of the good for her when she decides to sell it (i.e., the seller is uninformed).
If the auction is not pure private values, then the use of a secret reservation price
is less theoretically questionable. Hossain (2008) develops a clever alternative expla-
nation for the optimality of a secret reservation price. If a bidder can only assess his
willingness to pay the current price for an item, then a secret reservation price would
encourage the bidder to continue bidding in order to acquire more information. Fur-
thermore, with affiliated values a high public reservation price may discourage entry,
and the signal sent by having a large number of people enter the auction may outweigh
the signal sent by the auctioneer’s reservation price. For example, Vincent (1995) pro-
vides an example in which a secret reservation price can increase revenue in English
auctions. Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) show that when the reservation price enters
the bidder’s utility function as a reference point and when the optimal reservation price
is lower than the price that is attainable from an outside offer, then the use of a secret
reservation price is an optimal seller strategy. This insight may hold more generally,
if the signal sent by the outside offer is diminished by the signal contained in the res-
ervation price. However, this conjecture has not been formally modeled. Horstmann
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and Lacasse (1997) show that if the seller can open a second subsequent auction, then
a secret reserve price may be optimal; but this requires that the bidders know the seller
is reselling the good and it is unclear if this would be realistic given the eBay auction
formats.
Following the work of Vincent (1995); Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003a) find an opti-
mal selection criteria for the secret reservation value that increases seller revenue. The
increase is, however, quite minimal (at about 1%) and the results are highly leveraged
by their structural model. In part because of this, Katkar and Reiley (2006) conducted
a field experiment selling Pokemon cards on the Internet and found that a secret reser-
vation price brought 10% less revenue on average. They also found that the presence
of a secret reservation price reduced the likelihood of an auction’s ending in a sale by
about 30%, although the number of bids did increase, in keeping with Vincent (1995).
Unfortunately, any definitive conclusion based on the Katkar and Reiley study is ham-
pered by the size of the data set. Were the sample larger, it may be possible to estimate
the relationship between revenue and the reserve price and then compare, like Bajari
and Hortaçsu (2003a), the optimal values for both the public and secret reservation
price. The relationship between the existence of a secret reservation price and the
number of bidders found in Katkar and Reiley (2006) was not found by Dewally and
Ederington (2004) who studied the market for silver age comic books. The presence
of a secret reservation price decreased the number of active bidders by about 1.5, but
it has an insignificant impact on the sales price.
This long-standing puzzle in auction theory has not been resolved and with the
potential size of eBay data sets based on data mining algorithms, the potential exists
for very large scale empirical studies of such issues to be carried out. It is an excellent
environment to study and understand the rationale for using a secret reservation price.
4.2.3 Buy it Now
A unique option in eBay auctions is the Buy it Now (BiN) price. Generally on eBay this
option disappears as soon as someone bids more than the secret (or public) reserve.18
There are several explanations for why a seller would want to use a BiN price. These
explanations usually rest on several factors, including impatience, risk aversion, and
the distribution of format types.
Reynolds and Wooders (2009) show that when the seller is risk neutral and the bid-
ders are risk averse, both “temporary” (eBay style) and “permanent” (Yahoo! style)
BiN prices raise more revenue than does the ascending bid auction for a wide range of
buy prices. Moreover, for a given buy price, the permanent type raises more revenue
than does the temporary type.
Another paper considering both temporary and permanent BiN prices is Gallien
and Gupta (2007). They explain the use of both types of BiN prices by impatience,
which makes their work closely related to the work of Mathews (2004). In their model
the seller and the bidders are risk-neutral and impatient, and there is entry according to
a Poisson process. In contrast to Reynolds and Wooders (2009), they do not consider
18 Note that, as mentioned above, they are testing a longer lasting type of BiN in several categories.
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reserve prices. Using numerical simulations, they find that a temporary BiN price gives
a higher expected utility to the seller. They also find the optimal BiN price when there
is no reserve price. It is important to note that in their simulations the seller cannot
vary either the reserve price or the duration of the auction, the latter of which would
seem to be especially important given the impatience of the sellers.
The compelling argument of risk aversion is also used by Mathews and Katzman
(2006). They consider the joint choice by the seller of the temporary BiN price and the
reserve price in a model with risk averse sellers and risk neutral bidders. They show
that the seller maximizes his expected utility with a BiN price low enough that it is
accepted with positive probability and with a reserve price lower than what would be
optimal if no BiN price were possible.
As mentioned above, Bose and Daripa (2009) derive the optimal mechanism and
show that implementing this mechanism requires the use of auctions with a temporary
BiN price. In their model, a risk neutral seller first offers the item for sale at a posted
price to risk neutral bidders. If it fails to sell, then he offers it for sale at cost c > 0, via
an auction with a temporary BiN price. However, their assumption of the degenerate
distribution for the high valued buyers’ value constitutes a less compelling base for
explaining the use of BiN prices than the assumptions of risk aversion or impatience
on the part of bidders.
Shahriar (2008), differently from the papers mentioned thus far in this section,
assumes common value and shows that a temporary BiN price does not raise seller’s
revenue with either risk-neutral or constant-absolute-risk-averse bidders. Shahriar and
Wooders (2007) is an experimental study that considers both private and common val-
ues. Their finding that a temporary BiN price raises seller revenue when values are
private, supports risk aversion on the side of bidders as an explanation for the use of
BiN prices.
eBay states that it uses the temporary BiN out of a sense of fairness, thinking that
bidders would complain if, after seeing that they were winning an auction, the item
was bought at the BiN price. eBay goes on to say that there is evidence that a longer-
lasting BiN option might bring higher revenue to the seller and uses this to justify its
current experiment where the BiN price is available until 50% of the BiN price has
been met.19 Lastly, it is important to be aware that all of the models that are considered
in this section (like the vast majority of the literature on auctions) are based on a single
auction, and hence do not fully capture the complexity of eBay where, often, there are
many auctions of similar items taking place at the same time.
4.3 Trust, Feedback, and Corruption in eBay Auctions
One of the biggest problems that eBay auctions face is asymmetric information. In
any used good market this is a problem. On eBay one cannot even inspect the good
before bidding on it. The problem with asymmetric information is exacerbated by the
19 See http://forums.ebay.com/thread.jspa?threadID=2000449591&rw=true&anticache=1234510256015.
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sheer scale of business that is conducted on eBay. In 2007 a common problem was the
hijacking of the identity of established sellers in order to market spurious items.20
Jin and Kato (2007) examine how buyers and sellers of sports cards have adapted to
deal with the tradeoff between search cost savings advantage and information asym-
metries disadvantage of online markets, and how this has affected traditional retail
markets. They show that in equilibrium, the overall market is split into offline and
online segments depending on the quality of the cards and their certifications, which
is also supported empirically. Their data also suggest the shrinkage of the traditional
retail market after the arrival of the online marketplace.
Kazumori and McMillan (2005) suggest that depressed prices due to asymmetric
information problems might have been part of the reason that Sotheby’s stopped sell-
ing art on the Internet. Furthermore, Riefa (2008), offering a UK and EU perspective,
points to the lack of legal protection for buyers on eBay. eBay does not qualify as an
auctioneer, and the EU’s Electronic Commerce Regulations of 2002 have a lenient
legal framework. Moreover, there is no legal protection for consumer-to-consumer
auctions.
eBay has put in place a number of safeguards to deal with these issues. It originally
instituted its feedback system to help counteract the problem. It purchased PayPal,
an online payment system, and it now actively encourages buyers and sellers to use
PayPal. PayPal provides insurance for a buyer up to $20,000; and if the item is not
delivered or is not as described, then payment is not made to the seller. eBay has also
begun to report the percentage of negative feedbacks on the listing page, which pro-
vides bidders with more transparent information about sellers with bad reputations.
Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) found this change in reporting sellers’ reputations to have
increased the impact of a negative feedback on price. eBay’s detailed service report for
sellers now rates the seller in five different categories. eBay now distinguishes between
reputations that are based on sales and reputations that are based on purchases, and no
longer allows sellers to give buyers a negative feedback rating. eBay also has provided
a voluntary ID verify service that authenticates the identification of buyers and sellers.
eBay requires this ID verification for items priced over $15,000.
This section will analyze this serious issue for eBay. First we will discuss the amount
and cost of fraud on eBay. We next discuss a specific type of fraud: shill bidding. We
end the section with a discussion of the estimated impact of negative feedback on an
eBay seller.
4.3.1 The Amount and Cost of Fraud on eBay
Jin and Kato (2006) directly estimated the amount of fraud—or misrepresentation
of a good’s value—in the market for baseball cards. There are professional grading
services for baseball cards, but some sellers do not use these services and instead
simply offer their opinion on the quality of the baseball card. Jin and Kato bought the
ungraded cards and then submitted them to a grader to estimate whether the claims
of the owners were fraudulent. They found that sellers who claimed that their card
20 See http://www.ecommerce-guide.com/essentials/ebay/article.php/3652611; http://www.theregister.
co.uk/2007/03/21/ebay_fraud_anatomy/.
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was either “mint” or “gem mint” received a 27% higher price, but these sellers had
relatively lower average ratings than did the sellers of ungraded cards. Since the prices
that were paid for ungraded cards were substantially below the price for graded cards,
it would appear that the seller’s claims were discounted by the buyers, but perhaps not
discounted enough.
The cost of fraud on eBay can also be assessed by comparing the prices on eBay
to those received elsewhere. The problem with this comparison is that auctions on
eBay probably face greater competition, and as Sailer (2006) shows, the exit value of
a bidder on eBay should decrease the amount that he is willing to bid. A structural
model could be developed that would estimate both the exit value and the number of
bidders per auction. The two papers of which we are aware that have estimated such
a model have only estimated only the impact of various factors on the price. Dewan
and Hsu (2004) compare prices from eBay to prices of identical items from an estab-
lished stamp seller. They find that eBay prices were 10–15% less, with the differential
increasing as the stamp became more expensive. However, eBay has approximately
100,000 stamp auctions going on at any one time, while the established stamp seller
(Michael Rogers) runs auctions only twice a year. Furthermore, the Dewan and Hsu
study analyzed stamps that were Michael Roger’s specialty, stamps from East Asia.
Their results, however, were supported by Diekmann et al. (2008), who analyzed
tractor auctions on eBay and live auctions and found the predicted price on eBay was,
for the median tractor, 31% lower than the predicted price in a live auction. However,
if they restrict their estimates to items that cost less than $20,000 (and thus are covered
by PayPal insurance), the eBay discount drops to 26%. Moreover, some tractors were
sold for higher average prices on eBay. An interesting side issue is that their results
suggest that it is more profitable to sell a tractor for less than $20,000 on eBay. They
are able to report fees only for a competing online auction website, but the fixed fee
charged at that site, which almost covered the median price difference, and the 12%
commission (compared to about 2% on eBay) would make it much less profitable.
There may be an asymmetric information hazard on eBay, but at least in this particular
example it appears to be the best place for the seller.
4.3.2 Shill Bidding
One particularly pernicious form of abuse in eBay auctions is shill bidding. Essen-
tially, the auctioneer submits bids using a different identity to drive up the price. This
allows the seller to set a secret reserve price without paying the associated fee, though
in general there is some risk that he will end up purchasing the item. Several authors
(Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou 2004; Sinha and Greenleaf 2000) have shown that
if the seller could commit to not use shill bidding he should, but there is no credible
way to enforce this commitment. Thus we would expect to see quite a bit of shilling
on eBay, and unfortunately this is the hardest type of corruption to detect. Whether or
not it is common on eBay is an open question.
Engelberg and Williams (2009) point out that the way that price is determined on
eBay actually makes it possible to shill-bid without risk. The transaction price on eBay
is the second highest bid plus a bidding increment or the bid of the highest bidder,
whichever is lower. This means that if a shill bidder can bid within a bidding increment
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of the highest bid, then she can discover the high bidder’s value, since it will be the
sales price. Combined with anecdotal evidence that bidders almost always state values
ending in a dollar or fifty cents, a shill bidder has a perfect strategy: merely make sure
that every shill bid ends in an odd number of cents (X.37, or X.29, etc.) and always
increase your bid by less than the bidding increment. After enough bids the seller will
reach the high bidder’s bid with certainty. However, Engelberg and Williams (2009)
examined auctions for 40,000 event tickets and found that only 3% of all bids seemed
to use this strategy, while only 1.5% of all bids were actual shill bids.
A problem with the sustainability of the shill bidding strategy is that sniping may
make it ineffective. The hard closing time works to the advantage of eBay by decreas-
ing the gains from this type of fraud. When bidders snipe, the seller has no time to
drive up the price. Still, questions arise about the benefits of shill bidding. Hoppe and
Sadrieh (2006) sold DVDs and collectible coin bundles using three different tech-
niques: a low first bid alone, a low first bid and a secret reserve set at 60% of the book
value, and a low first bid with a later shill bid of about 60% of the book value. They
found that the revenue was basically indistinguishable among the three methods.
4.3.3 The Effectiveness of Feedback: Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard?
There are several analyses with different conclusions about the effect of seller’s feed-
back on price depending on the methodologies that are applied, the variables that are
controlled for, and how expensive the item under examination is. The methodologies
that are used to examine this effect would appear to be better suited to testing for
adverse selection. However, if it is not adverse selection but rather moral hazard that
is the key problem, then the methodologies used to estimate this relationship may be
flawed. Studies that test for moral hazard typically find large and significant effects
though they do not estimate the total cost of negative feedback. This is one of the
fundamental issues that must be understood in order to assess the viability of the eBay
marketplace.
If the effectiveness of feedback is driven by adverse selection, then there are dif-
ferent types of sellers, some good and some bad. In this case, a seller’s feedback score
plays the role of a signal that reveals information about the reliability of the seller and
hence decreases the information asymmetry that distorts the auction mechanism. This
eventually increases the sales price of the good, which would have been low due to
the low expectations of the under-informed bidders. The best way to tell the type of
a given seller is to take a large sample and look for the number of positive responses.
This is essentially what feedback or even better, what the percentage of positive feed-
backs represents. The early papers investigating this effect were Lucking-Reiley et al.
2007 and Houser and Wooders (2006). Houser and Wooders (2006) find, in a study
of Pentium processor auctions, that an increase in a seller’s feedback from 0 to 15
positives would increase the final sales price by about 5%, which is an economically
significant amount. On the other hand, Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007), in a study that
can be found to be weak for not controlling for the variation in market value of coins
in the auctions they study, do not find positive feedback to be statistically significant.
If a researcher wishes to test for whether or not there is a large adverse selection
problem on eBay, then he would typically regress price on total feedback or total
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negative feedback as well as other auction specific controls. A number of studies
have used this approach and have found little explanatory power for the various mea-
sures of a seller’s reputation. This general evidence is summarized in Resnick et al.
(2006), who report that the impact of one negative feedback is trivial. To estimate the
impact of feedback alone, controlling for items auctioned, wording, and other aspects,
Resnick et al. conducted a field experiment wherein inexperienced and experienced
sellers (2,000+ feedback rating) sell the same items. They found an 8.1% premium
for having a high reputation.
One problem with these studies is that they look only at relatively low cost items:
typically auctions in which there is little chance that the bidder loses much money.
Andrews and Benzing (2007), however, looked at the market for used cars-specifi-
cally, Honda Accords. In this market not only is there a known asymmetric information
problem, but the average price was $6,437. They found that there was a premium for
professional dealers and cars with clear titles, but also found that a good reputation
did not increase the sales price. They did find that the probability of sale was affected
by reputation, in keeping with other studies.
Adverse selection was also studied by Livingston (2005), who examined the impact
of the first few positive feedbacks on price and found evidence of an adverse selection
problem on eBay. A theoretical implication of the model developed by Livingston is
that the first few feedbacks are much more important in determining a seller’s rep-
utation than are other subsequent feedbacks, and this is borne out empirically. The
Livingston study also points out that many other papers that study the adverse selec-
tion problem utilize rather restrictive structural models. This limits the role that seller
feedback can have in determining price and thus (with standard estimation methods)
in revealing a significant empirical link between total feedback (or total negative feed-
back) and price.
While feedback can help an honest seller develop a reputation in a way to decrease
the information asymmetry, it is true that a seller, who will not sell on eBay anymore,
can find it optimal to use his reputation to cheat in his last transactions and earn a
high profit just before leaving. If instead of adverse selection distorting the auction
mechanism, the real culprit is this problem of moral hazard, then the total number of
positive feedbacks is not a relevant indicator of reputation, and what should matter
most to the bidder is the recent behavior of the seller. This suggests that, independent
of history, if one gets a negative feedback there should be a reaction, and one’s recent
feedback should matter much more than one’s total feedback. Cabral and Hortaçsu
(2010) find empirical support for this in that a seller’s first negative feedback is sig-
nificant in the final price, but there is less of an impact from further negative feedback
ratings. They show that when a seller receives his first negative rating, his weekly sales
rate drops 13%, and that even though the second negative arrives about 25% faster, it
has relatively little impact.
In their study Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) collected the data in a way that the prob-
ability of a seller receiving feedback is uncorrelated with the probability of receiving
a negative (positive) feedback (i.e. no selection). In order to support their assump-
tion, they carry out a statistical analysis of this potential selectivity problem and find
that the probability of feedback is uncorrelated with a variety of seller characteristics.
However, a buyer who observes a negative seller feedback rating may have a higher
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threshold for leaving a positive feedback, and thus it is still possible that the percentage
of positive feedbacks could decrease after one negative feedback. Since they base their
analysis solely on the feedback histories, this could appear as a drop in the number of
sales.
Results of Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) were confirmed by Eaton (2007) who esti-
mated the probability of sale in a market for electric guitars based on recent feedback.
If total negative feedback is used to measure the seller’s reputation, then the impact
on price is trivial; if negative feedback in the last 6 months is used, then the elasticity
is −.15, while if negative feedback in the last month is used, then he finds that an
additional negative rating will decrease the probability of sale by 9%. Eaton also finds
similar results for positive feedback and, interestingly, that the type of feedback is also
important. Negative seller feedback strongly decreased the probability of a sale while
negative feedback about the product itself (perversely) increased the probability of a
sale.
It is somewhat surprising that after so many years of analysis, the efficacy of eBay’s
feedback mechanism is so poorly understood. The available evidence would suggest
little adverse selection on eBay. However, there is only limited evidence about the
effectiveness of the feedback mechanism in the face of a moral hazard problem. Both
Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) and Eaton (2007) estimate the impact on the probability
of a sale and not the sales price. It is unknown what the cost is to a representative
seller. These appear to be open issues that are ripe for research that would be of great
interest to an eBay bidder and to eBay itself.
One last point involves what methods could be utilized in order to establish trust.
Dewally and Ederington (2002) analyze the market for silver age comic books and find
that the professional certification of a comic book is worth more than a high reputation
of the seller. They estimate that about 58% of the comic books should have been cer-
tified while only 29% actually were. Certification was the only method of conveying
quality which had a significant impact. Warranties and the provision of additional item
information had little impact on sales price. Standifird and Weinstein (2007) conducted
a similar study with Morgan Silver Dollars. In this industry there are many different
accreditation firms. The authors found that using one of the accreditation firms with a
good reputation had a significant positive impact on the price, but that using one of the
accreditation firms with a bad reputation hurt the final sales price. Perhaps this is an
avenue for eBay to explore in order to address the asymmetric information problem.
eBay could easily provide links to established accreditation firms and make it clear
how much of a benefit this could be to the sellers in extracting the best price for their
items.
5 Conclusion
eBay is now the strongest online auction marketplace in the United States, with gross
merchandise sales that make it equivalent in volume to the sixth largest traditional
retailer. However, it is not a traditional retailer; instead it is a forum used by other
people to buy and sell their goods. This makes it a market where many small and
independent decision makers decide on how the market behaves. Indeed it is nearly
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the fabled centralized marketplace that is assumed in neoclassical competition theory.
For this reason as well as for the prevalence of auctions on the eBay platform, it is of
great interest to economics.
Indeed eBay’s recent push towards increasing the amount of fixed price selling
will allow us to see empirically whether the auction mechanism can compete with
more traditional selling techniques. Several eBay commentators have stated that they
believe that auctions—the source of 58% of eBay’s gross sales in 2008—are on their
way out, dying due to the convenience of fixed price selling. The authors believe that
these pundits underestimate the attractive properties of auctions, but who is right will
be revealed with time.
This, of course, brings us to one of the primary puzzles that is still only partially
understood about eBay. Nowadays sellers use fixed price sales (Buy it Now), bar-
gaining (Buy it Now or Best Offer) and auctions. Why do they use so many different
techniques? Often the same seller will use all of the different techniques and one can
easily verify that popular items are being sold by all of these techniques. Is the expla-
nation based on the risk aversion of the bidders? If so, why do they use bargaining,
which has been usually believed to be inferior to one of the other techniques? Or—to
put the shoe on the other foot—since bargaining on eBay always allows for sales at a
fixed price, why is it not always revenue superior to use this type of bargaining? And
at the same time, does the choice of mechanism matter? Does some sort of general
revenue equivalence hold on eBay with formats that promise more surplus resulting
in more entry? These are just some of the mysteries of seller behavior that need to
be better understood. Perhaps the other single greatest remaining mystery is why so
many sellers use secret reservation prices. This and the low public reservation prices
in many auctions should be studied further.
Buyer behavior, as mentioned above, is generally better understood. We still do
not have a convincing general theory that explains why bidders use all of the above
techniques, but it does seem that risk aversion and quite probably the cost of keeping
track of auction bids does go a long way to explaining why buyers use fixed price
techniques. The reason that they use bargaining as well merits further research.
Perhaps the most exciting frontier of research on the buyer side of the market is the
possibility of developing a general econometric model of bidding. Sailer (2006) has
developed a model that addresses exit, and Nekipelov (2007) has developed a model
that allows for endogenous entry; clearly the next step is to develop parametric and non-
parametric models that address both issues simultaneously. Of course as Nekipelov
(2007) shows, the equilibria in these models may be hard to find analytically, but his
estimation does not require an analytic solution.
These techniques may also be able to help us understand the long standing puzzle
of whether feedback matters. If it does not, then rudimentary analysis would suggest
eBay should fail; but most estimates have suggested that feedback does not matter.
However, as pointed out above, this may be because most analysis assumes that the
problem on eBay is adverse selection, not moral hazard. The papers that have checked
for moral hazard have generally found a more significant impact from feedback. This
hypothesis needs to be more carefully analyzed. It is theoretically possible that with a
general structural model of bidding one can directly estimate the cost to a seller from
negative feedback. If this was done in several markets, we could finally know how
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well feedback works—which most likely will also provide valuable information for
eBay.
In all, eBay seems to be a promising and compelling area for future research, and
we look forward to the papers that will almost certainly be appearing soon to address
the issues above and other important issues, in part facilitated by the quick availability
of market data from eBay.21 Since this is a decentralized marketplace with relatively
simple and straightforward selling mechanisms, it may be possible to develop a sound
theoretic and empirical understanding of how this marketplace works. If a complete
understanding of such an important marketplace can be achieved, it would also mean
substantial progress in model development.
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